

1 **Title:** Effector-specific motor simulation supplements core action recognition processes in  
2 adverse conditions

3 **Running title:** Motor simulation in action recognition

4

5 **Author list:** Gilles Vannuscorps<sup>1,2,3</sup> & Alfonso Caramazza<sup>3,4</sup>

6 **Authors affiliations:**

7 <sup>1</sup> Psychological Sciences Research Institute, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium

8 <sup>2</sup> Institute of Neuroscience, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium

9 <sup>3</sup> Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA

10 <sup>4</sup> CIMEC (Center for Mind-Brain Sciences), University of Trento, Italy

11

12 **Corresponding author:** Gilles Vannuscorps, Psychological Sciences Research Institute,  
13 Université catholique de Louvain, Place Cardinal Mercier 10, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.

14 Phone: (32) 1047-8926. Fax: (32) 1047-3774. E-mail: gilles.vannuscorps@uclouvain.be

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17 **Abstract**

18 Observing other people acting activates imitative motor plans in the observer. Whether, and if so when  
19 and how, such “effector-specific motor simulation” contributes to action recognition remains unclear. We  
20 report that individuals born without upper limbs (IDs) – who cannot covertly imitate upper limb  
21 movements – are significantly less accurate at recognizing degraded (but not intact) upper-limb than lower-limb  
22 actions (i.e., point-light animations). This finding emphasizes the need to reframe the current controversy  
23 regarding the role of effector-specific motor simulation in action recognition: instead of focusing on the  
24 dichotomy between motor and non-motor theories, the field would benefit from new hypotheses  
25 specifying when and how effector-specific motor simulation may supplement core action recognition processes  
26 to accommodate the full variety of action stimuli that humans can recognize.

27

28 **Keywords:** Action recognition, working memory, motor simulation

## 29 **Introduction**

30 Every day, we see people executing sequences of body movements under a wide range of illumination,  
31 viewpoints, and occlusion in more or less cluttered and crowded environments. Despite the challenges  
32 imposed by these complicating factors, most of the time we recognize what they are doing, e.g., that they are  
33 “texting while walking”, “smiling” or “running” (e.g., Fademrecht, Nieuwenhuis, Bühlhoff, Barraclough, &  
34 de la Rosa, 2017; Ikeda & Watanabe, 2016; Ikeda, Watanabe, & Cavanagh, 2013). By action recognition,  
35 we refer to the ability to categorize observed body movements and postures as a specific instance of a  
36 known category of action – to “recognize” that the observed body movements constitute an instance of  
37 the action “doing a cartwheel”, for instance. Studies exploring the cognitive and neural bases of this  
38 ability have consistently reported that observing other people performing actions activates effector-  
39 specific imitative motor plans in the observer’s mind/brain (Buccino et al., 2001; Caspers, Zilles, Laird, &  
40 Eickhoff, 2010; Cracco et al., 2018; Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995). However, whether, and  
41 if so when and how, such effector-specific “motor simulation” contributes to action recognition remains  
42 unclear.

43  
44 The most influential early motor simulation theories attributed a critical role to effector-specific motor  
45 simulation in action recognition (Blakemore & Decety, 2001; Jeannerod, 2001; Rizzolatti & Craighero,  
46 2004; Rizzolatti et al., 2001). The most popular of these theories is the direct-matching hypothesis,  
47 proposed by Rizzolatti and colleagues following the discovery of mirror neurons in the macaque  
48 monkey’s brain. Based on the properties of these neurons, the authors proposed that they constitute a  
49 matching system that automatically translates the results of the visual analysis of observed body  
50 movements into their corresponding motor commands in the observer’s brain. Mirror neurons would  
51 allow action recognition because the observer “knows” what s/he is doing when s/he performs the same  
52 action (but see Csibra, 2007 for critical discussion). Thus, on this view, although actions may be  
53 recognized purely visually (without effector-specific motor simulation), direct visuomotor matching is the  
54 only mechanism “by which the meaning of the acts that are being observed are understood immediately”

55 (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008, p. 136) without the need of “additional complex inference processes”  
56 (Giese & Rizzolatti, 2015; Rizzolatti, Cattaneo, Fabbri-Destro, & Rozzi, 2014), and by which the  
57 observer is able to understand an observed action at a level that goes beyond its mere visual features  
58 (Nelissen, Luppino, Vanduffel, Rizzolatti, & Orban, 2005; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). Accordingly,  
59 Rizzolatti and colleagues refer to the finding that some brain-damaged individuals with motor circuit  
60 lesions become unable to recognize pictures or videoclips of familiar actions as a “compelling argument  
61 for the crucial role of mirror neurons in this function” (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010, 2016).

62

63 It has since become clear that such strong versions of the motor simulation theories, in which effector-  
64 specific motor simulation is necessary for efficient action recognition, are untenable. Many studies have  
65 reported action recognition difficulties in patients suffering from brain damage involving different parts  
66 of the motor system in the context of different aetiologies: patients with Apraxia (a disorder affecting the  
67 capacity to perform actions despite preserved basic motor and somatosensory functions), Motor-Neuron  
68 Disease, Parkinson’s Disease, and Cortico-Basal Degeneration present with difficulty to recognize action  
69 pictures and pantomimes (Buxbaum et al., 2005; Cotelli et al., 2006; Grossman et al., 2008; Negri et al.,  
70 2007; Papeo et al., 2010; Pazzaglia, Pizzamiglio, et al., 2008; Pazzaglia, Smania, et al., 2008; Silveri &  
71 Ciccarelli, 2007). However, the reported action recognition impairments cannot unambiguously be  
72 ascribed specifically to *motor system* damage because, in these disorders, brain lesions generally extend  
73 outside the motor system and most patients also present with other cognitive difficulties, such as  
74 executive function, attentional, and/or visuospatial disorders. Furthermore, at odds with the prediction of  
75 the strong versions of the motor simulation theories, there are also many reports of brain-damaged  
76 patients who, despite impaired action production, achieve normal performance in naming, or matching-to-  
77 a-word, pictures, video-clips, and pantomimes of actions (Kalénine, Buxbaum, & Coslett, 2010; Negri et  
78 al., 2007; Papeo, Negri, Zadini, & Rumiati, 2010). In a three-year longitudinal study, for instance, patient  
79 J.R. presented with increasing action production difficulty resulting from progressive bilateral atrophy in  
80 cortical and subcortical regions involved in the sensorimotor control of actions, notably the superior

81 parietal cortex, the primary motor and premotor cortex, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the basal ganglia.  
82 Despite the extensive damage to these structures, which are assumed to underlie motor simulation, J.R.'s  
83 ability to recognize actions remained intact and comparable to that of control participants in both  
84 accuracy and speed (Vannuscorps, Dricot, & Pillon, 2016).

85  
86 The hypothesis that action recognition is mediated by effector-specific motor simulation is also difficult to  
87 reconcile with reports of typically efficient action recognition in individuals who cannot rely on such  
88 mediation because of congenitally absent or paralyzed limbs (Vannuscorps & Caramazza, 2016b; Vannuscorps,  
89 Andres, & Caramazza, 2020; Vannuscorps, Andres, Carneiro, Rombaux, & Caramazza, 2020; Vannuscorps,  
90 Andres, & Pillon, 2013). Action recognition through direct-matching is a two-steps process: (1) observed body  
91 movements are translated into the corresponding effector-specific motor commands in the observer's brain and,  
92 (2) the simulation allows observers to "retrieve" information about what action these movements allow them to  
93 produce when they carry them out. In this scenario, previous motor experience with observed body movements is  
94 critical for effector-specific motor simulation to occur, and action recognition efficiency is assumed to depend on  
95 the similarity between the observed movements and those produced by the viewer (Calvo-Merino et al., 2006;  
96 Swaminathan et al., 2013; Turella et al., 2013; Tye-Murray et al., 2013). These two steps in action recognition are  
97 not available to observers with congenitally absent or paralyzed limbs. Extant evidence suggests that the motor  
98 cortex does not contain representations of congenitally absent or paralyzed limbs (Reilly & Sirigu, 2011; Striem-  
99 Amit et al., 2018). Rather, the specific parts of the somatosensory and motor cortices that would normally  
100 represent the "absent" or paralyzed limbs are allocated to the representation of adjacent body parts (Funk et al.,  
101 2008; Kaas et al., 1983; Makin et al., 2015; Stoeckel et al., 2009; Striem-Amit et al., 2018). In addition, and in  
102 any event, individuals with congenitally missing or paralyzed limbs have obviously never themselves executed  
103 any action using these missing or paralyzed limbs. Nevertheless, individuals born without upper limbs have  
104 been shown to be as fast and accurate as control participants at recognizing pictures and video-clips of  
105 upper-limb actions (Vannuscorps, Andres, & Pillon, 2013), and the quantitative and qualitative  
106 performance of some individuals born with facial paralysis is indistinguishable from that of control

107 participants in challenging lip-reading and facial expression recognition tasks (Vannuscorps, Andres,  
108 Carneiro, Rombaux, & Caramazza, 2020; Vannuscorps, Andres, & Caramazza, 2020).

109  
110 These findings challenge the central premise of effector-specific motor simulation theories: they  
111 demonstrate that it is possible to account for efficient action recognition without effector-specific motor  
112 simulation. Instead, they support theories of action recognition according to which action recognition results  
113 from a matching of observed body postures and movements to mental representations (descriptions) of the  
114 body postures and movements that characterize known actions stored in memory (Rothi et al., 1991;  
115 Giese & Poggio, 2003; see Figure 1).

116  
117 In the study of language, the term "input lexicon" is used to describe components of the language system  
118 that store abstract information about words that one has previously read ("input orthographical lexicon")  
119 or heard ("input phonological lexicon"). This information is deemed "abstract" in the sense that it is  
120 invariant to low-level sensory features. For instance, at this stage of processing a large capital letter "M"  
121 printed in red ink in Times New Roman refers to the same "abstract" representation of the letter "M" as a  
122 lowercase "m" printed in green in Arial (Grainger et al., 2008). By analogy, in the field of action  
123 recognition, Heilman and Rothi used the term "input praxicon" to refer to abstract representations of  
124 known actions stored in memory (Heilman & Rothi, 1993). Although what exactly is represented in the  
125 input praxicon remains insufficiently articulated, representations of known actions likely include  
126 information about a series of "units" of body postures and movements that together make up human  
127 actions. These likely include what are the parts of the body involved (vs. those whose posture and  
128 kinematic are not relevant), and for these body parts their characteristic configuration (e.g., fingers  
129 stretched, elbow flexed), position, orientation and kinematic (orientation, amplitude, number of  
130 repetitions, speed, velocity).

131

132 When one sees an action, it may be recognized in three stages. First, a visuo-perceptual analysis of that  
133 action decomposes it into its constituent postural and kinematic units (Giese & Poggio, 2003; Csibra,  
134 2007). In the field of object recognition, such initial parsing of the visual scene, referred to as “mid-level”  
135 vision, is assumed to compute a series of visual features such as, for example, the objects’ elongation axis,  
136 center, and curvature (Palmer & Rock, 1994; Sekuler, 1996; Ungerleider & Bell, 2011; Vannuscorps,  
137 Galaburda, & Caramazza, 2021). When one sees an action, the set of “units” computed is likely to  
138 correspond to the set of representational units that characterize known actions in the input praxicon. The  
139 result of this operation is compared with representations of known actions stored in the input praxicon. If  
140 a reasonably good match is found, the observed action is automatically, rapidly, effortlessly “recognized”  
141 as an instance of a known category of actions (e.g., as an instance of “waving goodbye”). Once  
142 recognized as an action of a certain type, access to a conceptual system allows the observer to retrieve  
143 knowledge about the action, like its typical cause, purpose and results, the typical agent and instrument  
144 involved, the needed force, approximate duration, and so on. Following a similar proposal in the field of  
145 object recognition (DiCarlo & Cox, 2007), we refer to the rapid, effortless, automatic recognition of  
146 actions that results from these three stages as “core action recognition”.

147

148 On this view, the observation of body movements is accompanied by two distinct types of “motor  
149 simulation” in the service of imitation, emulation, and motor learning (Buccino et al., 2004; Heilman &  
150 Rothi, 1993). Once analyzed as a set of relevant gestural “units”, observed body movements and/or  
151 postures are automatically translated into the motor commands that the observer would use to execute the  
152 same body postures and/or movements (e.g., Brass & Heyes, 2005). This “gesture-to-gesture” or  
153 “effector-specific” imitation/simulation must be distinguished from “action-to-gesture” or “effector-  
154 independent” emulation/motor simulation, which results from action recognition. Once conceptual  
155 knowledge has been accessed, it activates associated representations such as the phonological and  
156 orthographic lexicons that encode the spoken and written forms associated with the action (to name it;  
157 Shelton & Caramazza, 1999), and the “output praxicon” that stores learned motor programs associated

158 with action execution and object use (to execute it; Heilman & Rothi, 1993). In other words, once  
159 observed body movements have been recognized as an act of a particular type, the motor programs that  
160 the observer would use to execute that action are automatically evoked. The automatic activation of post-  
161 conceptual representations is supported by a range of findings, such as the demonstration that pictures of  
162 objects automatically activate their related phonological (Navarrete & Costa, 2005; Meyer & Damian,  
163 2007) and motoric (Bub & Masson, 2006) content, and that observers born without upper limbs activate  
164 brain regions involved in the execution of mouth and lower-limb actions when they observe hand action  
165 (Aziz-Zadeh, Sheng, Liew & Damasio, 2011; Gazzola et al., 2007).

166  
167 However, evidence that efficient action recognition is possible without effector-specific motor simulation  
168 does not imply that action recognition may not, in some conditions, require additional processing  
169 resources. Indeed, the idea that the core cognitive and neural mechanisms underpinning a given function  
170 may be supplemented by other ones when tasks or stimuli become more challenging is widely accepted.  
171 Although not necessary for auditory speech perception, for instance, it is well documented that lipreading  
172 enhances speech perception under difficult listening conditions (Akeroyd, 2008; Rönnerberg et al., 2013).  
173 Although object recognition may be largely solved by feedforward visual processing, additional recurrent  
174 processes become necessary under challenging conditions (Tang et al., 2014, 2018).

175  
176 Core action recognition is, by design, limited to cases in which the result of the visuo-perceptual analysis  
177 of the actors' body posture and movements may be matched onto a corresponding memory trace. When  
178 this is not possible, one must necessarily rely on additional resources and mechanisms. In line with this,  
179 for instance, information about the context in which an action takes place (e.g., the room) has been shown to  
180 facilitate specifically the recognition of actions that are unfamiliar (Wurm et al., 2017) or made perceptually  
181 ambiguous (Wurm & Schubotz, 2017).

182



183 As discussed above, “action-to-gesture” “effector-independent” motor simulation results from, and  
184 therefore cannot contribute to action recognition (Csibra, 2008; Gazzola et al., 2007). However, we see at  
185 least two ways by which effector-specific motor simulation may support the recognition of actions when  
186 core action recognition fails (see Figure 1). Previous evidence has shown that the ability to maintain  
187 meaningless, uninterpreted, body movements and postures in memory, even for just a few seconds, is  
188 augmented by effector-specific motor simulation (Galvez-Pol et al., 2020; Gao et al., 2015; Moreau,  
189 2013). Individuals born without upper limbs have been shown to be significantly less good than typically  
190 developed participants at maintaining hand postures in memory even for a few seconds (Vannuscorps &  
191 Caramazza, 2016a). In cases such as these, when core action recognition fails, one way in which effector-  
192 specific motor simulation may contribute to action recognition is by allowing the rehearsal of the  
193 observed gestures/postures, extending the time they will be available (in a motor format) for the more  
194 effortful recognition process. During this time window, the rapid decay of the initial transient visual trace  
195 is likely to transform action recognition from a process of matching a visual input onto a representation  
196 stored in memory to a process of attempting to identify which known action corresponds to the covertly  
197 executed movements (Figure 1A). In other words, although action recognition may operate rapidly on a  
198 pure visuo-perceptual basis when an action is familiar and perceived in optimal viewing conditions, motor  
199 simulation may offer to any observer able to covertly imitate the observed gestures a useful “tool” to  
200 extend the processing time window available to interpret actions when stimuli are more difficult to match  
201 rapidly onto memory representations – a role akin to that attributed to the articulatory loop component of  
202 working memory (Baddeley, 2012) in the ability to recognize speech under adverse conditions (Rönnerberg  
203 et al., 2010).

204

205 --- Figure 1 ---

206

207 During this time window, effector-specific motor simulation may also contribute by activating  
208 corresponding actions (if any) in the observer’s motor repertoire or “output praxicon” (Heilman & Rothi,

209 1993; Figure 1B). This contribution would be akin to the one described by Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia :  
210 “...observing actions performed by another individual elicits a motor activation in the brain of the  
211 observer similar to that which occurs when the observer plans their own actions, and the similarity  
212 between these two activations allows the observer to understand the actions of others without needing  
213 inferential processing” (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010, p. 268). As such, this process would be similar to  
214 that available to brain-damaged patients with pure alexia, who are unable to match perceptual  
215 representations of letters with their stored representations but may circumvent this disorder by tracing the  
216 shape of the letters (overtly or covertly) and, thereby, recognize the letter because they know what letter  
217 they trace when they typically use these motor programs (Kashiwagi, 1989; Lott et al., 2010; Starrfelt et  
218 al., 2013).

219  
220 In a previous study (Vannuscorps & Caramazza, 2016b), we addressed this possibility by comparing the ability  
221 of 5 individuals born without upper limbs and matched control groups of typically developed participants  
222 to recognize upper limb actions presented in either a familiar or unfamiliar format. In a first experiment,  
223 we showed them video-clips of an actress executing pantomimes of various familiar upper limb actions  
224 (e.g., playing the guitar, cutting with scissors) and used a gradual unmasking paradigm to measure the  
225 quantity of information (i.e. number of frames) necessary for the participants to recognize these  
226 pantomimes. By showing familiar actions in a familiar format, we aimed at assessing the efficiency of  
227 participants’ core action recognition system. To test the hypothesis that effector-specific motor simulation  
228 may enhance action recognition when core action recognition fails, we also needed stimuli that were  
229 sufficiently dissimilar from stored representations of known actions to hamper their automatic, rapid  
230 recognition by visuo-perceptual matching. Therefore, in a second experiment, we also measured their  
231 ability to recognize point light animations (PLAs) of upper limb (e.g., playing the violin) and lower limb  
232 (e.g., moonwalking) actions. PLAs of actions are extremely impoverished stimuli in which the stimulus is  
233 reduced to only a few dots depicting the spatiotemporal location of the major joints of the actor’s body.

234 Participants had never experienced PLAs before and these stimuli are very different from natural stimuli.  
235 Therefore, we assumed that these stimuli could benefit from effector-specific motor simulation.

236

237 The results of the first experiment were clear-cut: all five IDs performed as well as the control  
238 participants. The results of the second experiment were mixed, however. In line with the possibility that  
239 effector-specific motor simulation may contribute to action recognition when core action recognition fails,  
240 three IDs recognized significantly fewer upper-limb than lower-limb actions (in comparison to the  
241 controls). However, two others were slightly better at recognizing PLAs of upper limb than lower limb  
242 actions in comparison to the controls. We concluded that the performance of these two individuals  
243 “...demonstrate(s) the ability of the visuo-perceptual system, in the absence of motor simulation, [...] to  
244 perceive and interpret observed actions efficiently even when they are presented in extreme, impoverished  
245 conditions” (Vannuscorps & Caramazza, 2016b, p. 89).

246

247 We have since found reason to moderate and clarify this conclusion. A reanalysis of the performance of  
248 the two IDs who performed slightly better for manual than non-manual actions by means of the Bayesian  
249 Standardized Difference Test (Crawford & Garthwaite, 2007) indicated that this advantage was  
250 nevertheless smaller than that of approximately 30% of the typically developed population. This left a  
251 narrow space for a role of motor experience in the ability to recognize actions in adverse condition. This  
252 reconsideration of the original results led to the follow-up study reported herein. The goal was to gain  
253 more power to detect an impact of motor simulation on action recognition, if any, by testing additional  
254 individuals born without upper limbs. The results of the new analyses led us to reconsider our previous  
255 conclusions. In line with the conclusion of our previous study, we found conclusive evidence that the IDs  
256 recognize upper limb actions presented as pantomimes as efficiently as typically developed individuals.  
257 However, and in contrast with the conclusion of the previous study, we also found that the IDs, as a group, are  
258 significantly less accurate at recognizing PLAs of upper-limb than lower-limb actions.

259

## 260 **Material and Methods**

261 The study was approved by the biomedical ethics committee of the Cliniques Universitaires Saint-Luc,  
262 Brussels, Belgium, and all participants gave written informed consent prior to the study.

263

### 264 **Participants**

265 We report here the results of 2 individuals born without upper limbs (ID 6-7) and of one individual born  
266 without upper or lower limbs (ID 8) in addition to the 5 IDs (ID 1-5) already reported in our previous  
267 study (Vannuscorps & Caramazza, 2016b) and compared the performance of this group (4 females and 4  
268 males; mean age  $\pm$  SD:  $48 \pm 12$ ) to that of the 27 typically developed age-matched control participants  
269 reported in the original study (all right-handed, 17 females and 10 males; mean age  $\pm$  SD:  $45 \pm 10$ )  
270 without any history of psychiatric or neurological disorder. Information about the IDs' body schema was  
271 obtained through visual examination and interview. Information about prosthetic and phantom limb  
272 history was obtained through a questionnaire and complemented by interview when necessary. None of  
273 the ID reported any history of phantom limb sensation. All the IDs had typical lower limbs, except ID4  
274 who had a shortened right leg and ID8, who had missing lower limbs. Other relevant information is  
275 summarized in Table 1.

276

277 Note that we also recruited and tested another individual born without upper or lower limb in the context  
278 of this study (ID9). We decided against reporting his results because he could not be tested in the same  
279 conditions as the other participants. During testing, ID9 was lying face down next to the 5.5 inch.  
280 smartphone screen on which he performed the experiment. Therefore, the size of the stimuli had to be  
281 severely reduced.

282

### 283 **Stimuli and procedure**

284 All participants performed three experiments. The first two were identical to those reported in the original  
285 article (Experiments 1 and 2 in Vannuscorps & Caramazza, 2016b). In Experiment 1, participants viewed

286 video clips of an actress pantomiming 20 different upper-limb instrumental actions (e.g., playing a guitar;  
287 Agostini, Papeo, Galusca, & Lingnau, 2019). Only body movements were shown, without any object or  
288 context. In most of the stimuli (n=16) only the upper limb(s) moved (the face remained neutral and the  
289 body did not move). In the four other stimuli (to shoot a basketball, to play golf, to throw a ball, to shoot a  
290 bow and arrow) the upper limb movements were accompanied by coarse movements of the body and  
291 shoulders. All video clips were sized 978x550 pixels and had 30 frames/seconds. From each original  
292 movie we created 14 clips in which the number of frames ranged from 10 (330 msec) to 75 (2640 msec)  
293 in steps of 5 (165 msec). During the experiment, participants viewed the 14 versions of each video in a  
294 row, from the shortest to the longest one. The size of the actress on the computer screen was  
295 approximately 10 cm. Each trial began with the presentation of a black screen for 1000 msec, followed by  
296 the video clip and a screen on which was written the question “What was the action mimed by the  
297 actress?”. Participants responded orally to the question and the experimenter wrote down their responses.  
298 They were encouraged to provide a response at each step, even if they were not sure. There was no time  
299 constraint for responding but participants were asked not to respond before the end of each video clip. An  
300 item was scored correct at a given level of demasking (from 1 to 14) if it was identified correctly also at  
301 all subsequent levels and was scored 15 if not recognized.

302

303 In Experiment 2 (Experiment 2 in Vannuscorps & Caramazza, 2016b), participants viewed video clips  
304 depicting an actor reduced to 12 light dots (approximately 5 mm of diameter) corresponding to captors  
305 originally placed on his main joints (center of the head, shoulders, elbows, wrists, center of pelvis, knees,  
306 and ankles; “Point-Light Animations”, PLA) executing 20 upper limb (e.g., fishing) and 20 non upper  
307 limb actions (e.g., walking backward). The video clips were sized 700x1024 pixels, had 33  
308 frames/seconds and lasted 5 seconds. These stimuli were chosen from a set of 83 point-light animations of  
309 actions created from a motion capture database (asf/amc format obtained from the Carnegie Mellon  
310 University Motion Capture Database) with a software developed locally. These 83 point-light displays  
311 were shown to two groups of 20 control subjects. Participants of Group 1 (Mean Age= 24.8; 10 males)

312 were presented the PLAs and asked to name them. Participants of Group 2 (Mean Age= 23; 5 males) were  
313 presented the same PLAs as Group 1 except that the upper limbs were masked (elbows and wrist  
314 removed) in order to determine the role of these limbs in the identification of each action. From this  
315 preliminary study, 20 upper-limb actions (Group 1's mean = 87.75%, Group 2's mean = 8.25%) and 20  
316 lower-limb actions (Group 1's mean = 93.75%, Group 2's mean = 92%) were selected. During the  
317 experiment, participants viewed the 40 video-clips in the same pseudo-randomized order. The size of the  
318 actor on the computer screen was approximately 9 cm. Each trial began with the presentation of a black  
319 screen for 1000 msec, followed by the video clip and a screen on which was written the question "What  
320 was the action?". Participants responded orally to the question and the experimenter wrote down their  
321 responses. They were encouraged to provide a response for each stimulus, even if they were not sure.  
322 There was no time constraint for responding but participants were asked not to respond before the end of  
323 each video clip.

324  
325 In Experiment 3, participants viewed video clips of an actor pantomiming the 20 upper-limb actions  
326 depicted as PLAs in Experiment 2. Only body movements were shown, without any object or context. All  
327 video clips were sized 720x1280 pixels, had 25 frames/seconds and lasted 5 seconds. During the  
328 experiment, the size of the actor on the computer screen was approximately 7 cm. Each trial began with  
329 the presentation of a grey screen for 1000 msec, followed by the video clip and a screen on which was  
330 written the question "What was the action mimed by the actor?". Participants responded orally to the  
331 question and the experimenter wrote down their responses. They were encouraged to provide a response,  
332 even if they were not sure. There was no time constraint for responding but participants were asked not to  
333 respond before the end of each video clip.

334  
335 During the experiments, the control participants and IDs 1-5 were seated in front of a computer screen  
336 located at a distance of about 60 cm. The experiments were controlled with the E-Prime software  
337 (Psychological Software, 2002, Pittsburgh, PA) and presented on a 15.6 inch Dell Latitude E5530 anti-

338 glare laptop screen set at 1366 x 768 pixels and 60Hz. IDs 6-8 were tested remotely under supervision of  
339 the experimenter through a visual conference system. The experiments were controlled by the online  
340 testable.org interface (<http://www.testable.org>), which allows precise spatiotemporal control of online  
341 experiments. At the beginning of each experiment, IDs 6-8 were sitting in front of a computer screen and  
342 instructed to set the browsing window of the computer to full screen and minimize possible distractions  
343 (e.g., TV, phone, etc). Next, a calibration procedure ascertained a homogeneous presentation size and time  
344 on all computer screens. Finally, the participants started the experiment.

345

## 346 **Results**

347 The results of Experiments 1 and 2 are displayed in Figure 2. We first analyzed the data of Experiment 1 and  
348 tested whether the IDs' (1-8) lack of motor experience with the upper limbs impacted their ability to recognize  
349 manual actions depicted as pantomimes. This was not the case. Descriptive analysis of the data indicated that the  
350 IDs (Median = 4.3) needed on average fewer steps of demasking than the controls (Median = 4.7) and the  
351 results of a Mann-Whitney U test provided no support for the hypothesis that the IDs are less efficient than the  
352 controls at identifying pantomimes of actions ( $W = 147.5, p = 0.94$ ). An additional Bayesian Mann-Whitney  
353 U test performed with a Cauchy prior centered around zero and with a width parameter of  $r = 0.707$  for  
354 effect size on the alternative hypothesis indicated that the data was 6.02 times (Bayes Factor) more likely  
355 under the hypothesis that IDs are better or as good as the controls at identifying pantomimes of actions  
356 than under the hypothesis that the IDs are less efficient.

357

358 --- Figure 2 ---

359

360 Then, we analyzed the data of the PLA naming task. We first tested whether the IDs 1-7, as a group, were less  
361 accurate at recognizing upper limb than lower limb actions, everything else being equal – that is, in comparison to  
362 the baseline provided by the performance of the typically developed controls for both action categories.  
363 Descriptive analysis of the data indicated that there was indeed a larger difference between manual and non-

364 manual actions in the IDs (Medians = 10 and 18, respectively) than in the controls (Medians = 14 and 17,  
365 respectively). The results of an ANOVA with GROUP as between-subject factor and EFFECTOR as within-  
366 subject factor on the data transformed by an Adjusted Rank Transform (ART) procedure (Leys &  
367 Schumann, 2010) indicated that this interaction between GROUP and EFFECTOR was significant ( $F(1, 32)$   
368  $= 8.08$ ,  $p = 0.008$ ,  $\eta^2 = 0.2$ ). The results of an additional Bayesian repeated measure ANOVA indicated  
369 that the model including an interaction between GROUP and EFFECTOR was 6.8 times (Bayes Factor) more  
370 likely than the model including only the main effects. Second, we tested whether ID8, who is missing both  
371 upper and lower limbs, was less accurate than control participants for both lower and upper-limb actions.  
372 The results of two modified  $t$ -tests (Crawford & Howell, 1998) indicated that this was the case (both  
373 modified  $t$ s  $< -3.23$ , both  $p$ s  $< 0.002$ ). Finally, we tested whether IDs 1-8, as a group, were less accurate at  
374 recognizing PLAs of upper limb actions than the typically developed controls. The results of both frequentist ( $W$   
375  $= 155$ ,  $p = 0.03$ ) and Bayesian (same parameters as above for the alternative;  $BF = 1.6$ ) Mann-Whitney U tests  
376 supported this hypothesis over the alternatives.

377  
378 Third, we analyzed the data of Experiment 3 and tested whether the IDs' (1-8) lack of motor experience with the  
379 upper limbs impacted their ability to recognize pantomimes of the upper limb actions depicted as PLAs in  
380 Experiment 2. The goal was to ensure that the difficulty to recognize upper limb actions detected in Experiment  
381 2 could be attributed to the format of the stimuli (PLAs), rather than to the manual actions being less familiar or  
382 harder to recognize than in Experiment 1. In line with this, both the IDs (Mean = 19.89, SD = 0.35) and the  
383 controls (Mean = 19.48, SD = 0.89) recognized these actions accurately. In the IDs, only ID2 failed to  
384 recognize one action (playing golf). This suggested that the upper-limb actions used in Experiment 2 were  
385 not difficult to recognize when presented in a more familiar format. Yet, to directly test the hypothesis that  
386 the IDs' difficulty with the manual actions in Experiment 2 could be attributed to the format of the PLAs,  
387 we conducted an ANOVA with GROUP as between-subject factor and FORMAT (PLAS VS. PANTOMINES) as  
388 within-subject factor on the data transformed by an Adjusted Rank Transform (ART) procedure (Leys &  
389 Schumann, 2010). The interaction between GROUP and FORMAT was significant ( $F(1, 33) = 15.4$ ,  $p <$



390 0.001,  $\eta^2 = 0.32$ ). The results of an additional Bayesian repeated measure ANOVA indicated that the  
391 model including the interaction between GROUP and EFFECTOR was 128 times (Bayes Factor) more likely  
392 that the model including only the main effects.

393

394

395

## 396 **Discussion**

397 Perceiving the body movements of someone else activates not only brain areas in the observer's visual perceptual  
398 system, but also in his/her motor system. This finding has generated a debate about the role of motor  
399 representations and processes in recognizing others' actions. According to a strictly perceptual view, action  
400 recognition relies on a visuo-perceptual analysis of the actor's body shape and motion, which provides the visual  
401 description that "activates" a representation of the corresponding action category stored in memory (Giese  
402 & Poggio, 2003; Rothi, Ochipa, & Heilman, 1991; Jellema & Perrett, 2005; Johansson, 1973). On this view,  
403 although automatically activated, motor representations are not involved in the processes of action recognition. In  
404 contrast, "motor theories" of action recognition propose that the recognition of others' actions is supported by  
405 covert unconscious imitation of the observed body movements in the observer's motor system (Rizzolatti,  
406 Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001; Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2010). To address this issue, we extended a previous study  
407 that examined whether individuals born without upper limbs (congenital aplasia) have difficulty in recognizing  
408 upper limb actions – actions that they are unable to covertly imitate (Vannuscorps & Caramazza, 2016b). In line  
409 with the conclusion of that previous study, the results of the current study indicate that the IDs are able to  
410 recognize manual actions presented as pantomimes as efficiently as typically developed individuals. However,  
411 and in contrast with the conclusion of the previous study, we now find clear evidence that the IDs are  
412 significantly less accurate at recognizing PLAs of actions that they are unable to imitate than PLAs of actions that  
413 they can imitate.

414

415 These results contribute to constrain the contribution of effector-specific simulation to a narrower scope  
416 than that initially hypothesized by motor simulation theories. Previous studies had shown that individuals  
417 with brain damage or a congenital disorder could 1) recognize carefully crafted pictures and video clips of  
418 familiar actions that they could not covertly imitate (“effector-specific motor simulation”) as rapidly as  
419 typically developed participants (Vannuscorps, Andres & Pillon, 2013; Vannuscorps, Dricot & Pillon, 2016)  
420 and 2) even use fine-grained kinematic information to draw different types of inferences, such as the mental state  
421 of an actor or the most likely outcome of an action, as efficiently as typically developed participants  
422 (Vannuscorps & Caramazza, 2016b; Vannuscorps & Caramazza, 2017). The results of Experiment 1  
423 additionally demonstrate that individuals who cannot covertly imitate observed postures and movements  
424 do not require more information to recognize an action. This finding cannot be explained by a lack of  
425 sensitivity of the measure, or as a mere null effect. The measure is sensitive, with no ceiling or floor effect  
426 and a Bayes Factor provided positive evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the IDs are at least as good  
427 as the control participants in this task.

428

429 Of course, this does not *imply* that effector-specific motor simulation does not support the recognition of  
430 actions presented as pantomimes in typically developed participants. Correlated sensorimotor experience  
431 may be necessary for the development of motor contributions to action perception (e.g., Catmur and  
432 Heyes, 2019) and the IDs may have developed an atypically efficient visual system to compensate for  
433 their congenitally missing limbs. In this case, our results would have to be interpreted as useful evidence  
434 about the range of computational and neural plasticity that is possible in a system that typically relies on  
435 motor simulation. However, this alternate conclusion faces several challenges. First, it seems difficult to  
436 reconcile with evidence of efficient action recognition in patients with acquired motor disorders  
437 (Kalénine, Buxbaum, & Coslett, 2010; Negri et al., 2007; Papeo, Negri, Zadini, & Rumiati, 2010;  
438 Vannuscorps, Dricot & Pillon, 2016), and with evidence that individuals with congenitally missing or  
439 paralyzed limbs are not only as efficient as control participants in recognizing actions, but also engage the  
440 very same neural network (Vannuscorps, Wurm, Striem-Amit & Caramazza, 2019) and perform tasks in a

441 way that is qualitatively very similar (Vannuscorps, Andres & Caramazza, 2020; Vannuscorps &  
442 Caramazza, 2016b). In addition, and more importantly, we are not aware of experimental evidence that  
443 would justify favoring this less parsimonious alternative conclusion. As reviewed elsewhere, the  
444 interpretation of the results from neuroimaging, behavioral, neuropsychological, and TMS studies, which  
445 have been cited in support of motor simulation theories of perception, has been challenged (Vannuscorps  
446 & Caramazza, 2016b; Hickok, 2014; Caramazza, Anzelotti, Strnad & Lingnau, 2014). For instance,  
447 although there is clear evidence that action recognition may be modulated by concurrent motor tasks and  
448 transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the motor cortex, such evidence would be compelling only  
449 if one were to assume that TMS and concurrent motor tasks affect specifically and *only* motor simulation  
450 (Hamilton et al., 2004; Ipser & Cook, 2016; Maringer et al., 2011; Oberman et al., 2007; Paracampo et al.,  
451 2017; Rychlowska et al., 2014). There is clear evidence against this assumption. In addition to mobilizing  
452 the motor system itself, moving one's limb feeds efferent copies and corollary discharges of the motor  
453 commands to the sensory and perceptual pathways involved in motor control (Wolpert et al., 2003). For  
454 example, moving one's body parts activates not only the motor system but also parts of the visual cortex  
455 involved in the perception of these body parts (Astafiev et al., 2004; Dinstein et al., 2007; Orlov et al.,  
456 2010). Likewise, TMS applied to an area may have distant effects on other areas to which it projects  
457 (Papeo et al., 2015; Ruff et al., 2009; Siebner et al., 2009). Thus, TMS applied to the motor system may  
458 have functional effects upon action recognition by modulating the visuo-perceptual system to which it is  
459 naturally connected to support the control of one's movements. Although it is possible that the IDs' ability to  
460 recognize upper-limb actions is supported by idiosyncratic computational and neural mechanisms, at this  
461 juncture experimental evidence on the ability to recognize familiar actions depicted in a familiar format is  
462 better and more parsimoniously explained without effector-specific motor simulation. In line with this  
463 conclusion, the results of fMRI studies conducted to identify the brain areas underlying core action  
464 recognition (i.e., the recognition of familiar actions presented in a familiar format) collectively suggest  
465 that it relies on visuo-perceptual (i.e., lateral occipito-temporal cortex and inferior parietal lobule) rather  
466 than motor areas of the brain (see Wurm & Caramazza, 2022 for review).

467  
468 Nevertheless, there remains ample space for a role of effector-specific motor simulation in action  
469 recognition. The demasking paradigm used in Experiment 1 measures the amount of information required to  
470 recognize an action. However, performance in this task may reflect both immediate recognition and the result of  
471 other processes (e.g., decision, guessing), which may have differently contributed to the performance of the  
472 controls and of the IDs. Therefore, it remains possible that effector-specific motor simulation contributes to the  
473 ease or speed of action recognition. At odds with this possibility, two previous studies had reported individuals  
474 with acquired and congenital motor disorders who were able to recognize (name) pictures and video clips  
475 of actions that they could not imitate as accurately and as rapidly as typically developed participants  
476 (Vannuscorps et al., 2013, 2016b). However, the main statistical tool used in these studies to test for a  
477 deficit in an individual patient, the modified  $t$  test (Crawford & Howell, 1998), has a power of only  
478 approximately 60% to detect a 2SD deficit. Therefore, it remains possible that effector-specific motor  
479 simulation may contribute to some extent to the speed of action recognition. Another possibility is that  
480 effector-specific motor simulation contributes to decrease the cognitive cost of action recognition, a hypothesis  
481 that, to our knowledge, has yet to be tested, or to the recognition of challenging action stimuli. The findings from  
482 the PLA naming task support this possibility: IDs 1-7 recognized upper limb actions presented as PLAs  
483 significantly less accurately than lower limb actions in PLAs (everything else being equal) and ID8  
484 recognized PLAs of both upper and lower limb actions less accurately than control participants. This  
485 finding corroborates those of previous studies showing that patients with hemiplegia and paraplegia suffer  
486 from difficulties to recognize actions depicted as PLAs (Arrighi et al., 2011; Serino et al., 2010). Note,  
487 however, that the latter findings were interpreted, and have been cited so far, as evidence of a contribution  
488 of the motor system to core action recognition, that is, to action recognition *in general*. Our findings  
489 challenge this conclusion: the ID's specific difficulty for upper limb actions restricted to those presented  
490 as PLAs, and not to pantomimed actions, suggests that motor simulation may contribute only to the  
491 recognition of challenging action stimuli.

492

493 Future studies will be needed to explore whether effector-specific motor simulation also plays a role in the  
494 recognition of challenging real-life action stimuli. We chose to use PLAs in this study because of their  
495 widespread use in the field of action and body movement perception (Blake & Shiffrar, 2007) and previous  
496 evidence suggesting that PLAs were difficult to recognize for patients with different types of motor disorders  
497 (Arrighi, Cartocci, & Burr, 2011; Serino et al., 2010). One could object that the PLAs have low ecological  
498 validity, raising the question whether our findings have any implication for the recognition of challenging stimuli  
499 in real-life. Three main lines of evidence mitigate this concern, however. First, motor involvement during action  
500 recognition has been shown to increase in various types of challenging conditions, such as when offline  
501 transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) interferes with the observer's visuo-perceptual system (Avenanti et al.,  
502 2013), when the stimuli are meaningless (Héту et al., 2011), or when they are less familiar (Stapel et al.,  
503 2010). Second, and more convincingly, the effect of various methods that interfere with motor simulation on  
504 action recognition (such as TMS and transcranial random noise stimulation applied on the observer's premotor  
505 cortex) has been shown to be larger (Paracampo et al., 2018) or even specific (Penton et al., 2017; Yang &  
506 Banissy, 2017) to individuals for whom the task is most challenging (i.e., with low baseline performance). Third,  
507 although we have previously shown that the IDs perform at a typical level of efficiency in the hand laterality  
508 judgment task with simple hand postures (Vannuscorps & Caramazza, 2015; Vannuscorps, Pillon, & Andres,  
509 2012), a recent study found atypical performance in individuals born with congenital unilateral hand dysplasia in  
510 laterality judgments using more complex hand postures involving atypical finger and wrist orientations (Maimon-  
511 Mor et al., 2020). For all these reasons, it is likely that motor simulation helps action recognition in a variety of  
512 challenging conditions in real-life. As a first approximation, we hypothesize that motor simulation might  
513 contribute to action recognition whenever core action recognition fails. Potential reasons for core action  
514 recognition to fail include, but are not limited to, limitations linked to the observer (e.g., low visual acuity,  
515 familiarity with some actions) and information loss at the level of the stimulus itself such as when a  
516 stimulus/an action is occluded, insufficiently informative, or too unfamiliar to be automatically matched  
517 onto an action representation stored in memory. A different level of familiarity with the actions depicted as PLAs  
518 may explain, for instance, the large variability of performance in the IDs.

519

520 In sum, our findings are consistent with previously apparently diverging results, cited either in favor or  
521 against the direct-matching hypothesis of action recognition, and in fact reconciles them. Thus, they are  
522 consistent both with the finding that at least some patients with apraxia, despite their action production  
523 deficit, perform within the normal range in identifying actions from pantomimes or pictures, and with the  
524 finding that patients with hemiplegia or paraplegia have difficulties in naming or detecting PLAs of  
525 actions. This emphasizes the need to reframe the current controversy regarding the role of effector-  
526 specific motor simulation in action recognition: instead of focusing on the dichotomy between motor and  
527 non-motor theories, the field would benefit from new hypotheses specifying when and how effector-  
528 specific motor simulation may contribute to the recognition of actions. Beyond this question, our findings  
529 encourage future theoretical work and empirical studies to consider with more attention the nature of the  
530 stimuli used to study the cognitive and neural bases of action recognition. Eventually, the goal should be not  
531 only to develop models detailing the cognitive and neural mechanisms underlying core action recognition, but  
532 also to describe what, when and how effector specific motor simulation may supplement core action recognition  
533 processes to accommodate the full variety of action stimuli that humans can recognize.

534

535 As a first attempt in that direction, we propose to distinguish three different routes to action recognition,  
536 schematized in Figure 1. Of course, this hypothesis is at an early stage of development, in several  
537 respects, and future studies will be needed to evaluate and refine this proposal. However, we believe that  
538 this proposal has some value in that it provides a much-needed tractable framework for thinking about  
539 when and how effector-specific motor simulation may contribute to action recognition. In this spirit, we  
540 wish to conclude by making explicit that we assume that the contribution of these different routes to  
541 action recognition depends on their availability and their efficiency. The role of availability is trivial:  
542 when one or several routes are unavailable, for instance because the stimulus is unfamiliar, or because the  
543 observer is deprived of the motor representations required to covertly imitate the observed body  
544 movements, then action recognition depends on the other route(s). The efficiency claim proposes that

545 when several routes are simultaneously available, action recognition efficiency depends uniquely on the  
546 most efficient of these routes. The availability assumption is motivated by the IDs' specific deficit for the  
547 upper-limb actions (that they are not able to imitate) presented as PLAs (that are not depicted in a familiar  
548 format). In turn, the efficiency assumption seems necessary to explain the IDs' typically efficient  
549 recognition of pantomimes, pictures, and video-clips of upper-limb actions reported in this and previous  
550 studies.

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554

555 **Competing interests**

556 The authors declare no conflict of interest.

557

558 **Data availability**

559 The data underlying this article are displayed in the article (Figure 2). They will be promptly shared by  
560 the corresponding author upon request.

561

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844 **Figure legends**

845 Figure 1. Schematic representation of three different “routes” to action recognition. Core action  
846 recognition refers to the automatic, effortless matching of familiar body postures and movements onto a  
847 corresponding stored action representation. When core action recognition fails, action recognition may be  
848 supplemented by effector-specific motor simulation (see text for detail).

849

850 Figure 2. Results of Experiments 1 and 2 by individual participant and group.

851